Back in January, I got into a debate with some work colleagues over the status of political science as a “true” scientific discipline. Though I think one or two were playing devil’s advocate, the consensus seemed to be that political science was not worthy of the second half of its name. I argued (and do believe), however, that it is indeed a valid science.
To be honest, I can’t remember my friends’ specific arguments (we may or may not have been sitting in a hot tub in the mountains and a few drinks in — thus making the debate fairly comical to begin with). I’ll be sure to let them know I’ve blogged about it so they can correct, clarify, or elaborate on their arguments in the comments. As I remember it, though, their main contention was that because political science is the study of human behavior, and because observations of human behavior cannot reliably be generalized and retested to form a consistent theory or law, the study of politics cannot be classified as a science in the same vein as physics, chemistry, or the other “natural” sciences. It’s simply too flaky.
At Davidson (where Taylor and I went for undergrad and both majored in political science), there is a huge division among the department faculty on this point. Currently, every political science major is required to take “Methods and Statistics in Political Science,” a course that is almost uniformly dreaded. “I’m majoring in a social science precisely because I suck at math”, they complain. “When will I ever use this again?” The science and math wannabes that we are, Taylor and I loved it, and ended up working with our professor one summer on a quantitative study of how congressmen shape their political messaging.
The fear of the course stems mostly from a failure by the faculty to execute any kind of positive PR, because really, it’s not that bad and not that hard. Anyone who is smart enough to get into Davidson can handle it. The first half of the course doesn’t deal with a single number, formula, or regression model, but rather shows how to take a question of politics and attack it using the scientific method. Delineate the specific question, form a hypothesis, decide what the variables are, and propose a way to run an experiment. Not hard, right? The second half is certainly more difficult because it delves into the quantitative realm using computer-aided regressions; but really, it’s nothing impossible and the professors are not only ready, but eager to help them understand and succeed.
In an article called “The Lamentable State of Science Education in Political Science” (sorry, I can’t find a free version online besides on the Davidson course page *cough* first linked reading *cough*), Kim Hill from Texas A&M University asserts that research political scientists
seek scientific explanations for observable, natural phenomena. [...] Ours is inherently a natural science – with no concern for supernatural, paranormal, or otherwise other-worldly matters. Any college graduate today who does not understand the scientific character of the social sciences is as ignorant as one who confuses astronomy and astrology or chemistry and alchemy.
She further notes that it is widely accepted that, as a relatively young discipline, political science is “essentially identical to the mature physical sciences at equivalent stages in their development.” Indeed, “it is the rare major policy decision of the U.S. government, General Motors, the Ford Foundation, or any other comparable entity that is made without notable recourse to social science argument and evidence.” Hill soberly laments that “ours is the only scientific discipline I know that essentially fails to educate its undergraduate students in its primary concerns. [...] Indeed, they are as skeptical about that matter when they graduate as when they matriculate.”
The seeds of this skepticism are fairly obvious and wholly understandable. Studying human behavior and systems is inherently unpredictable. It is seemingly impossible to control precisely for variables, and difficult to measure results or even come up with the right units of measurement. The laboratory of political science is the whole world and its recorded history; experiments can be costly, time consuming, and sometimes one-and-you’re-done opportunities (we can’t recreate the 2004 U.S. presidential election to measure “that one thing we forgot to measure”). And perhaps most interestingly, the subjects of scientific political study are… us. And not only our decisions, but often our preferences, our passions, and our opinions. These things are flimsy, indefinite, and trigger our biases. Studying politics scientifically and objectively requires a temporary suspension of our beliefs.
By no means do I argue that any study of politics is or should be scientific. It is entirely possible to study politics in other ways (and indeed, I’d argue that a considerable portion of political science courses are not really political science courses). Perhaps this is why many colleges and universities call the major “government” or “politics”. There’s nothing wrong with this at all. My argument, rather, is that almost anything can be studied scientifically. Literature. Art. Music. Basketball. History. Cooking. I’m not arguing that political science is a robust scientific discipline that has a great track record of discovering any kind of Truth, or any consistently verifiable Law of Human Behavior. But sciences are not defined by the number or importance of the truths they elicit. Science is not a conclusion. Science is an approach.
Problem. Hypothesis. Variables. Experiments. Results. Conclusion. Boom, you’re done. Your results don’t have to prove your hypothesis true — they rarely do. Your experiment could have been a complete failure — you forgot to control for an important variable; you discovered you were asking the wrong question; you realize that you cannot extrapolate anything from your data; etc. So what? Happens in chemistry labs around the world every single day. You haven’t failed to apply science. You’ve learned something. You plug the holes, change your models, and you try again.
The newest issue of Wired — guest edited by J.J. Abrams and dedicated to the idea of “mystery” — leads with an excellent piece by Brian Greene, a physicist and author of The Elegant Universe and The Fabric of the Cosmos. Greene writes (sorry, it’s not online yet…):
To the vast majority, science is solely about answers — the material that’s sandwiched between the covers of their textbooks. It’s understandable. For the most part, we teach science as if it were a technical trade: Learn these facts about cells. Memorize these equations describing motion. Balance these reactions that underlie oxidation. And then demonstrate competence by passing an exam. With this lopsided focus on the end points of research, the scientific explorations themselves receive the most minimal attention.
But science is the journey. Science is about immersing ourselves in piercing uncertainty while struggling with the deepest of mysteries. It is the ultimate adventure. [...] Einstein captured it best when he wrote, “the years of anxious searching in the dark for a truth that one feels but cannot express.” That’s what science is about”
Who would dare preclude the social sciences from this quest? What nobler or more righteous use of the scientific method than to better understand humans, how we interact with each other politically, how we construct our institutions, how we achieve efficiencies and better serve our societies’ needs… or how we manipulate these systems to exploit others and consolidate absolute power? In these times of partisan polarization, global poverty and hunger, financial uncertainty, and environmental meltdown, we need every model of analysis we can get our hands on.
And now, a word from Randy Newman:
Comic used under a Creative Commons license courtesy of xkcd.com.
Subscribe by feed
Subscribe by email
Follow on Facebook
As one of the person in the spa arguing against the “science” in Political Science, I'll lay down my own antithesis.
In stark contrast to Jarred/Taylor, I graduated from the large public University of California, Santa Cruz (Go Banana Slugs!) and majored in Politics (and Legal Studies). There is no poli sci major…guess why…
I think this debate has fallen on the wrong issues or perhaps I'm not ascertaining the correct one(s). To me it centers of two things: 1) the implications and legitimacy that “science, scientific results/studies” confer and 2) the hegemony in which “science” has over our understanding of valid knowledge. The problem is that the majority of people believe that a scientific applied method is tantamount to validity even in the social studies arena. Simply flashing the “scientific results” card confers instant legitimacy beyond what is warranted. Not to put to fine a point on it but I think social scientist are trying to validate/confer legitimacy in their findings by calling themselves “Scientist”; and their results “scientific.” However, numbers and statistics won't make their theory as strong as it would be in the the hard sciences. Trying to impress this legitimacy, validity and exactitude is dangerous to our humanity/morales/ethics. I also believe it is as the core of this discussion.
Numbers don't equate science. Number while powerful aren't deserving of the label of “science” alone. The problem is “Social Scientist” think their equating apples and apples when the hard (physical, chemical and astronomical) sciences are actually oranges. Simply attaching the label of “science” does not confer legitimacy. The forces that act upon the social scientist variables (i.e idea, emotions, history, class…etc ) are different than the hard scientists (i.e. gravity, chemistry, computer algorithm). It's not just the numbers or the method that makes sciences… science. It's the accuracy with which we can predict the outcome because of how predictable the variables are. These variables are understood in such a way that they won't deviate in ways that we cannot foresee (element, temperature, speed, density etc). Neutrons just don't spontanosusly decide to move counter clockwise or revolt against the oppressive atom class and form the neutronian proletariat (maybe they do… I'm no scientist). Social scientific results don't always result in real world outcomes or actions – this isn't just symptomatic of bad theory but of a terribly applied method for the social sciences. When scientific result halt to have the predicted real world outcome they stop being science and return to theory – bad theories at that. Scientist are looking for answers that they can rely on for scale, repetition and perpetual verification (e.g. it takes x amount of enegery to shoot a rocket weighing 200 lbs into space – scale that to a 2,000 lbs rocket then it takes x amount of energy times 10 to move the 2000 lbs rocket). In the social sciences you can't take 100 San Diegans, 200 Las Angelenos and 200 San Franciscans and get results, as scientific as our last example, for the California Gubernatorial election. You most certainly can't transfer that knowledge and apply ito the same groups 60 or even 1 year from now – much less transfer it to different cultures say the Danish or something. We can also see the same (or different) scientific results in the social sciences to come up with two completley different answers (e.g. affirmative action is bad for minorities; affirmative action is good for minorities). You just don't see that with real science [*perhaps you do in theoretical science] (unless the physical properties of the component change). If you want to argue that the variable in the social science example changed just like the variables in the sciences example, you've missed the point. Politics, people, history etc are not as predictable, reliable and exact as the physical elements/variables used in real science. So while yes, the physical variable can change the outcome… science already knows why, how and can calculate it exactly (too much energy or too much weight caused the rocket to deviate in an exact and mathmatically predicable way). Social scientist can't predict this sort of phenomenon. There are simply exponentional amount of possibilities with no real way of predicting the validity of one of them.
Calling social science “science” is a misnomer that has had terrible consequences (science: Nazi atrocities, eugenics, political science: calling FL for Al Gore in 2000, determine 6% of Americans won't vote for Barack because they're racist, Jon McCain picking Sarah Palin FTW). Science is supposed to be amoral and politics, especially the vast and eclectic issues or topics that it touches on, is not. Granted this may be tangential, but I think the legitimacy of attesting your reasoning to science and validating the results as exact can create larger ethical problems. The exactitude to which social scientific results supposedly warrant – by being scientific – might actually be contrary to our humanity/ethics/values/beliefs and hinder our ability to engage in dialogue, discussion and debate (the very ways we use to rationalize our decisions). When a social scientist precieves X to be valid and true because of the supposed “science” behind it, s/he may be unwilling to engage in discourses, discussions or debate with others counter views. Without our ethical, biases etc – and all it's faults – an objective procession for decision making, like science, could essentially robs us of our humanity (e.g. eugenics, Skynet from the Terminator series).
While it's nice to have graphs, data, percentages and standard deviations to go with your theories it doesn't elevate it to the level of scientific infallibility or legitimacy. Even real scientist understand that their end data is just a theory waiting to be disproved or affirmed. While we think of gravity as “a law” we understand that the physical properties that create gravity can change and suddenly we could all start floating on Earth. So give up this title and accept that not having “science” attached to your conclusions is no less valid. It's cool to have a quantitative component to your theory but it doesn't legitimate it or render it inherently better than other methods in social studies. More importantly, don't get rid of the quantative element either because we know it works on people (whether valid of not). Perhaps it would be better to call political science Quantitaitive Politics or something.
While it'd be nice to base everything off of a perfect method that renders valid result every time… the scientific method is not that method for social studies. It's not that easy, these questions are harder and more complex than any single uniform method, or epismological paradigm can handle. Trying to legitimize or claim otherwise is somewhat unfathomably to me and extremely insulting to insinuate a non-quantitative/scientific career leaves one “ignorant” (kimhill)
My final concern is this, I'm just afraid we're only going to leave questions up to science and validate scientific research in the future instead of dialogue, debate, discussion and compromise. I feel that last of these are more in line with what politics has been at it's core since the ancient Greeks and Enlightenment theorists…and I just don't remember what studies or statistics they came up with that have shaped our all of our contemporary conceptions.
* when I speak of “social studies” I mean “social sciences” like Psychology, Economics and Poli Sci.
**Interesting side note: if you change the “political scientists” perspective for religion, you may find the same exactitude, validity and infallibility transfer. Which makes it impossibly difficult to render a decison when science and religion conflict over a topic.
“Bean” and I talked about this at length today at work, and it seems that our overarching disagreement is due in large part to our general divergence over the definition of science.
The Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines science as follows:
I am working more off of the first definition, I think, while Bean is working more off the second. In my mind, the primary definition of science is as a systematic study. While the COED specifies it a little further as the study of “the physical and natural world,” I would argue that since politics is about human behavior, this definition still fits. I certainly admit that the second definition of the word “science” is also correct — that it can indeed refer to a body of knowledge that has been systematically organized and tested. But for my purposes, I believe something can be studied as a “science” and yet fails to deliver any (for lack of a better word) valid results. Bean, on the other hand, would say that something is not a “science” unless it yields valid results.
Taking that fundamental disagreement aside, Bean's real concerns seem to be over entirely different questions. I'll try to respond to all of them.
1) “The problem is that the majority of people believe that a scientific applied method is tantamount to validity even in the social studies arena. Simply flashing the “scientific results” card confers instant legitimacy beyond what is warranted.”
Definitely a valid concern, and one I share. Scientifically-gleaned results are misinterpreted, abused, and made out to mean more than they really mean all the time, including in the physical sciences. Not only that, but the process of science itself can be abused through selective choice of variables, selective testing, biased interpretation of results… even by asking a question in a way that will lead to the results you want. It sucks, and too many people fall for it. Does that mean that the subject matter can't be studied scientifically, though? Of course not. It's just bad — or as many call it, “junk” — science. The methods and spirit of science can be corrupted, but it's still in the big bucket of “science”.
2) I think social scientist are trying to validate/confer legitimacy in their findings by calling themselves “Scientist”; and their results “scientific.”
Is this true in some cases? Probably so. Does it happen in the physical sciences too? Absolutely. “This fur is from Big Foot, we studied it in an advanced chemistry lab and ran exhaustive tests, and it does not match any animal or human samples ever tested in modern science.” Again, this is a terrible abuse of the legitimacy that “science” confers, and it happens in the social sciences too. Does that mean the subject can't or shouldn't be studied scientifically? Of course not.
3) Numbers don't equate science.
Nor would I ever suggest they do. I'm not saying that if there are poll numbers to match your hypothesis, then you've found some awesome truth. I'm saying that political questions can be approached using a scientific method, and that the results of this analysis will possibly lead to useful results. If the results aren't useful, fine. But I still think you have studied the question scientifically, which in my mind, makes it a science.
4) The forces that act upon the social scientist variables (i.e idea, emotions, history, class…etc ) are different than the hard scientists (i.e. gravity, chemistry, computer algorithm).
Of course they are. And no, at the moment, we don't have the tools or means of measurement to break human decisions into its discrete parts. There are absolutely some things that science cannot measure about human decisions and human history. But there are absolutely thousands of things that it can measure. Many of your arguments don't register with me because you assume that social science can't control for many, if any, variables. Of course they can.
In your example of the California governor's race, of course taking the samples you describe and saying “this represents California” is unsound science. Of course simply turning this into a predictor for 60 years from now, or applying them to another country, is unsound science. But whether done maliciously or out of sheer ignorance, it's science — just misapplied.
5) We can also see the same (or different) scientific results in the social sciences to come up with two completley different answers (e.g. affirmative action is bad for minorities; affirmative action is good for minorities). You just don't see that with real science [*perhaps you do in theoretical science] (unless the physical properties of the component change).
Physical science never yields conflicting results? I find that hard to swallow. This is why scientific studied are peer reviewed — and often tested separately — before being published. Sure, most of the scientific “facts” that we are taught today are close to indisputable. But on the more cutting edge of science, people are getting conflicting results and proposing conflicting theories about them all the time. Yet, are these people not scientists, and their efforts not scientific?
6) So while yes, the physical variable can change the outcome… science already knows why, how and can calculate it exactly (too much energy or too much weight caused the rocket to deviate in an exact and mathmatically predicable way). Social scientist can't predict this sort of phenomenon. There are simply exponentional amount of possibilities with no real way of predicting the validity of one of them.
Again, I think you're giving the hard sciences way too much credit. There are many things that the physical sciences can predict with great reliability and accuracy. But there are many things that the physical sciences simply cannot explain. You've mentioned gravity a few times. Check out this whole section on Wikipedia about gravitational anomalies and discrepancies that can't be accounted for yet. Sure, social sciences can so far predict or account for very little. So we should just stop? Tell that to Galileo.
7) Science is supposed to be amoral and politics, especially the vast and eclectic issues or topics that it touches on, is not.
Agreed. I am not saying that scientific study will tell us what the most moral form of government is, or the most ethical treatment of enemy combatants. But certain questions of politics can be — if not answered — clarified or supported by systematic, and sometimes quantitative analysis. Because the scientific approach can't answer everything about politics doesn't mean it can't answer anything about politics.
8) Even real scientist understand that their end data is just a theory waiting to be disproved or affirmed.
And “real” political scientists believe nothing different.
9) [It is] extremely insulting to insinuate a non-quantitative/scientific career leaves one “ignorant” (kimhill)
I think you've completely misunderstood what Hill said, and I'll just requote her: “Any college graduate today who does not understand the scientific character of the social sciences is as ignorant as one who confuses astronomy and astrology or chemistry and alchemy.” She asserts that a college graduate who denies the scientific nature of the social sciences is ignorant, not that they're ignorant if they don't choose a career that emphasizes this scientific part. I don't totally defend her statement, of course, since I believe the vast majority of “political science” courses are indeed not really emphasizing the science part at all — so it's easy to understand why college grads don't consider political science a “science.” There are relatively few departments out there worthy of the name.
10) My final concern is this, I'm just afraid we're only going to leave questions up to science and validate scientific research in the future instead of dialogue, debate, discussion and compromise. I feel that last of these are more in line with what politics has been at it's core since the ancient Greeks and Enlightenment theorists…and I just don't remember what studies or statistics they came up with that have shaped our all of our contemporary conceptions.
I see and empathize with your concern, but question your evidence. One big reason we don't have any studies or statistics from the ancient Greeks is because the disciplines of science and statistics didn't really exist back then. Science didn't really show up until the Middle Ages, and the scientific method not widely applied until almost the end of the 19th century (see Wikipedia). I'm not saying the ancient Greek or Enlightenment theorists would have opted for a scientific approach instead, but I also don't think it's fair to say that science takes backseat to theory because Plato didn't take any polls.
Jarred and Bean –
Thank you for the thoughtful discussion on the question of whether or not political science is, indeed, a “science.” I have to agree with Jarred on this front: political science, can, at minimum, “be considered a science.” As Chapter 1 of every single natural science textbook ever written summarizes, science is simply the application of the scientific method (an “approach). And indeed, political science can and often does apply such a method. But I also concede that one elephant in the room is whether or not political science can successfully operationalize variables that provide the same level of utility found in the natural sciences, or even in other social sciences such as economics. But again, as Jarred points out, why should the matter rest at, “We can't, so we shouldn't.” Logicians would point to this classical fallacy and say, “Hmph! Why not? Logically speaking, this doesn't make sense.” The dreamers among us might point to this reasoning and say, “Tell it to Galileo.” I point to this reasoning and say, “We can't, but it doesn't matter.”
In other words, while we cannot perfectly apply the scientific method to political considerations, I would argue that imperfection does not equate lack of utility (and note that I'm completely disregarding the other argument to be made, namely that the natural sciences may no more perfectly apply such methods to their own work). As an example, I'd like to point out York Zimmerman's work at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC). As a graduate student years ago, Zimmerman operationalized roughly 50 variables that he considered necessary for “revolution,” namely through political means (whether in the form of toppling an authoritarian regime, or simply by overthrowing one long-standing ruling party in favor of the other: see Orange Revolution, as a prime example). To date, he has narrowed those variables to less than 10 that he considers absolutely necessary for such revolution. But what is more is that his organization is now examining whether or not, from the ground-up, they can help foment a handful of those variables on the path towards institutional change. For example, they have made documentaries and written books and have even developed a video game (A Force More Powerful: The Game of Nonviolent Strategy), all with the aim of spreading an understanding among the masses of how revolutions have occurred in the past, why a given people's specific circumstances are ripe for such revolution and how they might bring about that revolution in the near future.
Now while some may point to such efforts and scoff, it seems that Zimmerman's efforts shed some light on this discussion. Essentially, he's long worked on a theory of social revolution and what circumstances set the stage for a successful social revolution, largely based on a qualitative and historical approach. He then operationalized a set a variables and essentially developed the political science equivalent of a “prescription drug” in the form of tools that very well may tip the scales in favor of revolution. And as far as I can tell, this process is surprisingly, albeit awkwardly, akin to the very efforts taking place in “real” science labs all around the world. And from what I understand, Zimmerman's work is being met with remarkable success.
Interestingly, the question that I am more concerned with is whether or not the “science” part of political science should even be taught as part of political science and government majors in our nation's colleges and universities. As a stalwart supporter of the liberal arts, I am absolutely convinced that the “science” part is integral to a budding political science major's education. At minimum, it provides an overview of the principles under girding much of our political analysis, whether we realize it or not. And it challenges students to consider their own course of study through a different lens; often, political science majors are indeed “math averse,” but understanding for example that operationalizing variables isn't mathematical at all, but instead a necessary M.O. in any kind of research, can help students become better thinkers, writers and critics, even if what they are critiquing is the science of politics itself.
In sum, I never want to become a political scientist. But I think the empirical thrust that they can provide to our understanding of human behavior is not only important, but critical. Any approach that stands alone is bound to topple, whether historical, narrative, empirical or otherwise. But taken together I think each approach can complement the other, and that at minimum, any budding political science student should be exposed to them all.
I would include links, but I'm not certain how. Jarred?
Gagan
I can understand the argument that social sciences have to deal with a more complicated set of variables than do the natural sciences. But as Gagan points out, complexity shouldn't scare us away from investigating a topic. Take the question of emotion in politics. How could we possibly understand how politicians attempt to manipulate something as vague and amorphous as love and hate? The answer is to take baby steps and to look at what others have done, particularly in psychology. A recent book by Ted Brader (Campaigning for Hearts and Minds) does exactly this. Using tightly controlled experiments, Brader begins to unpack exactly how campaign ads selectively prompt certain emotions, in hopes of influencing evaluations of candidates. This type of work is another great example of how the scientific method can help us understand political dynamics.
I also wanted to address the point that “We can also see the same (or different) scientific results in the social sciences to come up with two completley different answers (e.g. affirmative action is bad for minorities; affirmative action is good for minorities). You just don't see that with real science [*perhaps you do in theoretical science] (unless the physical properties of the component change).”
This point appears to be mixing or confusing several things. The initial statements are normative prescriptions about whether affirmative action is good or bad. It is important to separate those from the actual scientific analysis. Any analysis inherently contains certain biases and assumptions, but we hopefully strive to make the analysis as objective and transparent as possible. If you repeat the analysis, you should get a similar result (if the analytical process is valid). If you change the analysis, then you’ll get a different result. People often manipulate the details of analysis in order to make a certain or desirable result more likely. Once you get a result, you then have to figure out what to do with it, which is where normative considerations come in, ideally. Of course, we do see very different results in real science. The most public example is the ongoing debate over the existence and causes of global warming. But, there are many more examples hidden in the specific subfields of the sciences, where results vary and debate rage about the appropriate procedure, assumptions, and outcome.
Finally, Hill is a he.
I can understand the argument that social sciences have to deal with a more complicated set of variables than do the natural sciences. But as Gagan points out, complexity shouldn't scare us away from investigating a topic. Take the question of emotion in politics. How could we possibly understand how politicians attempt to manipulate something as vague and amorphous as love and hate? The answer is to take baby steps and to look at what others have done, particularly in psychology. A recent book by Ted Brader (Campaigning for Hearts and Minds) does exactly this. Using tightly controlled experiments, Brader begins to unpack exactly how campaign ads selectively prompt certain emotions, in hopes of influencing evaluations of candidates. This type of work is another great example of how the scientific method can help us understand political dynamics.
I also wanted to address the point that “We can also see the same (or different) scientific results in the social sciences to come up with two completley different answers (e.g. affirmative action is bad for minorities; affirmative action is good for minorities). You just don't see that with real science [*perhaps you do in theoretical science] (unless the physical properties of the component change).”
This point appears to be mixing or confusing several things. The initial statements are normative prescriptions about whether affirmative action is good or bad. It is important to separate those from the actual scientific analysis. Any analysis inherently contains certain biases and assumptions, but we hopefully strive to make the analysis as objective and transparent as possible. If you repeat the analysis, you should get a similar result (if the analytical process is valid). If you change the analysis, then you’ll get a different result. People often manipulate the details of analysis in order to make a certain or desirable result more likely. Once you get a result, you then have to figure out what to do with it, which is where normative considerations come in, ideally. Of course, we do see very different results in real science. The most public example is the ongoing debate over the existence and causes of global warming. But, there are many more examples hidden in the specific subfields of the sciences, where results vary and debate rage about the appropriate procedure, assumptions, and outcome.
Finally, Hill is a he.
i want to ask if really political science is a science or a act
While you might think that science is boring you can still teach your child to love it, all it takes is a little effort and a little time.