http://www.newsweek.com/id/135376

http://www.newsweek.com/id/135376

Does anyone else remember reading about a handful of studies recently that pretty convincingly showed that there are certain nutrients (or proteins or something?) that are only found in meat? Point being that while we do eat way too much meat as a society, the moral consideration of the abstract individual isn’t entirely settled. We have evolved to be human, in large part, because we eat meat. Although, our mastery of technology may preclude us evolving along true lines of “natural selection” anymore, so that too may be moot.

Just an interesting fact, that adds to Ashish’s final factoid: “The United States kills 8 BILLION chickens a year.” (David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. Oxford UP, 2007. page 174)

Does anyone else remember reading about a handful of studies recently that pretty convincingly showed that there are certain nutrients (or proteins or something?) that are only found in meat? Point being that while we do eat way too much meat as a society, the moral consideration of the abstract individual isn’t entirely settled. We have evolved to be human, in large part, because we eat meat. Although, our mastery of technology may preclude us evolving along true lines of “natural selection” anymore, so that too may be moot.

Just an interesting fact, that adds to Ashish’s final factoid: “The United States kills 8 BILLION chickens a year.” (David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. Oxford UP, 2007. page 174)

I noticed neither you nor Jarred have suggested what you think the proper basis for moral consideration is. If I were a meat-eater, I would probably balk at the prospect as well because it is difficult to draw a moral circle that includes those entities we want to see protected while excluding those we want to see on our plates.

Could species membership be the proper foundation for moral consideration? That would certainly seem to make our sympathy for a range of fictional non-human characters (Data from Star Trek, ET, etc.) seem silly. Could it be free will and the ability to participate in moral communities? That criterion would exclude severely retarded infants, who do not and will never possess those traits. Could it be the soul? Well, possibly, but that would require establishing various theological principles that are very difficult to demonstrate.

As for Pollan’s comments…No animal rights theorist’s arguments depend on establishing that animals and humans have identical responses to stress. Suppose, following Dennett, that we make a distinction between pain and suffering (a distinction that might, indeed, be accurate). Even factory farm animals that lack robust self-consciousness–and again, pigs do not fall in this category–or Lockean personhood will experience severe pain during throughout their lives. It doesn’t matter if the cow heading for slaughter dreads the blade or reflects on his fate the way a prisoner heading to the electric chair would; what matters is if the cow has a nervous system similar enough to ours that we can reasonably say that the cramped, filthy conditions leading up to that grim march frustrated the animal’s natural instincts and inflicted discomfort and if you can imagine the pleasure you receive from your meal outweighing those misfortunes. A person would certainly suffer much more torment in factory farm conditions than a cow or pig, but that doesn’t soften the pain factory farmed animals experience. And let’s be clear: Factory farmed animals endure those cramped, filthy conditions for months while you savor your meal for a few minutes.

Pollan’s invocation of “animality” reminds me of the appeal to the “sanctity of marriage” made by gay marriage opponents: Both are conveniently numinous ideas that circumvent empirical and analytical scrutiny. And the vaguer an idea is, the harder it is to refute. At any rate, I think there are higher virtues than those offered by our ancestral inheritance–mercy, for one. As Milan Kundera put it, “True human goodness, in all its purity and freedom, can come to the fore only when its recipient has no power.”

Jarred–
Interests are cognitive properties related to seeking and avoding various environmental cues, and cognitive properties emerge from the mind. Plants lack minds, so they lack interests too. But if you can cite any biologists or philosophers of mind who think plants have minds, I’d be interested in seeing their, um, reasoning. But even if plants did have interests, we would simply be forced to choose between the lesser evil–eating corn, say, or eating a full-grown mammal.

But you know what all those animals in factory farms eat? Plants. In fact, “Though some 800 million people on the planet now suffer from hunger or malnutrition, the majority of corn and soy grown in the world feeds cattle, pigs and chickens. This despite the inherent inefficiencies: about two to five times more grain is required to produce the same amount of calories through livestock as through direct grain consumption, according to Rosamond Naylor, an associate professor of economics at Stanford University. It is as much as 10 times more in the case of grain-fed beef in the United States.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/weekinreview/27bittman.html?pagewanted=all

I noticed neither you nor Jarred have suggested what you think the proper basis for moral consideration is. If I were a meat-eater, I would probably balk at the prospect as well because it is difficult to draw a moral circle that includes those entities we want to see protected while excluding those we want to see on our plates.

Could species membership be the proper foundation for moral consideration? That would certainly seem to make our sympathy for a range of fictional non-human characters (Data from Star Trek, ET, etc.) seem silly. Could it be free will and the ability to participate in moral communities? That criterion would exclude severely retarded infants, who do not and will never possess those traits. Could it be the soul? Well, possibly, but that would require establishing various theological principles that are very difficult to demonstrate.

As for Pollan’s comments…No animal rights theorist’s arguments depend on establishing that animals and humans have identical responses to stress. Suppose, following Dennett, that we make a distinction between pain and suffering (a distinction that might, indeed, be accurate). Even factory farm animals that lack robust self-consciousness–and again, pigs do not fall in this category–or Lockean personhood will experience severe pain during throughout their lives. It doesn’t matter if the cow heading for slaughter dreads the blade or reflects on his fate the way a prisoner heading to the electric chair would; what matters is if the cow has a nervous system similar enough to ours that we can reasonably say that the cramped, filthy conditions leading up to that grim march frustrated the animal’s natural instincts and inflicted discomfort and if you can imagine the pleasure you receive from your meal outweighing those misfortunes. A person would certainly suffer much more torment in factory farm conditions than a cow or pig, but that doesn’t soften the pain factory farmed animals experience. And let’s be clear: Factory farmed animals endure those cramped, filthy conditions for months while you savor your meal for a few minutes.

Pollan’s invocation of “animality” reminds me of the appeal to the “sanctity of marriage” made by gay marriage opponents: Both are conveniently numinous ideas that circumvent empirical and analytical scrutiny. And the vaguer an idea is, the harder it is to refute. At any rate, I think there are higher virtues than those offered by our ancestral inheritance–mercy, for one. As Milan Kundera put it, “True human goodness, in all its purity and freedom, can come to the fore only when its recipient has no power.”

Jarred–
Interests are cognitive properties related to seeking and avoding various environmental cues, and cognitive properties emerge from the mind. Plants lack minds, so they lack interests too. But if you can cite any biologists or philosophers of mind who think plants have minds, I’d be interested in seeing their, um, reasoning. But even if plants did have interests, we would simply be forced to choose between the lesser evil–eating corn, say, or eating a full-grown mammal.

But you know what all those animals in factory farms eat? Plants. In fact, “Though some 800 million people on the planet now suffer from hunger or malnutrition, the majority of corn and soy grown in the world feeds cattle, pigs and chickens. This despite the inherent inefficiencies: about two to five times more grain is required to produce the same amount of calories through livestock as through direct grain consumption, according to Rosamond Naylor, an associate professor of economics at Stanford University. It is as much as 10 times more in the case of grain-fed beef in the United States.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/weekinreview/27bittman.html?pagewanted=all

- I believe you are probably right that a majority of people distinguish animals into groups based on intelligence in the fashion you describe. But is that segregation the same basis by which people choose to eat or not eat those animals? Maybe there’s correlation, but are you sure there’s also causation? Again, I don’t have evidence either way… do you?

- Although the parallel you draw between my remarks and gender discrimination is convincing (especially given the charged and emotionally loaded nature of the latter, which makes it a difficult minefield for me to tread in my response), I think it is ultimately flawed.

First, those two arguments operate on two different orders of magnitude: rights among members of the same species, and rights among different species. It’s like comparing a green apple to a red apple, versus comparing an apple to an orange. Thus, I believe that the two issues are not very comparable.

Secondly, I believe you misinterpreted my reasoning, or I did not make it clear enough. You criticize my argument on the basis that “the fact that we occupy a place of dominance in the natural world doesn’t justify the conventional understanding of that role.” Did I ever argue anything to that effect? No, quite the opposite, actually. I first stated that it is an unchangeable fact that, as a species, we are at the top of the food chain. Of course being omnivores is our inheritance. Do you disagree either with the truth or unchangeable nature of that claim? If so, that’s a different argument, so I’ll operate for the moment as if you agree. I next state that because of that fact, we must choose to exercise that role (for lack of a better word) with justice. It IS a choice for each of us to make. It’s not just going to happen by itself. To return to your analogy: did not men, despite the scientific fact that they are the physically stronger sex, have to concede dominance in order that women could access and enjoy their rights as equal members of the species?

Again, I sought not to justify any sort of behavior because of our dominance, only to point out that the fact is indeed true: we are at the top of the food chain, as a species. I believe it is beyond our control. Just like it is impossible – as far as I can imagine – for men to render their gender physically weaker than women, so I believe it to be impossible for humans to not be at the top of the food chain. And given that, it is for individuals and communities to choose how to play that part with justice. That’s all.

- I do agree with your overall suggestion that neither intelligence- nor emotion-based evaluation of the morality of eating any or all animals is proper. You suggest that it is an animal’s ability to experience pain and have interests that should govern the choice. How do you define an animal’s interests? An interest in survival? What is the difference between an animal having an interest to survive and a plant having an interest to survive?